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In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he became the fifth British prime minister to occupy the role over a six-year span.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its sixth prime minister in two years – three of them in the last ten months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for support from Socialist lawmakers as the price for his government’s survival.

But it is, in the best case, a temporary fix. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for decades – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Minority Rule

Essential context: ever since Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three warring blocs – left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.

At the same time, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now almost twice the EU threshold, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are nigh.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In mid-September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.

So much so that the following day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.

Another twist in the tale: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for another 48 hours in a last-ditch effort to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were early elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, engaging with all willing listeners. At the end of his 48 hours, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The leader's team announced the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.

Macron honored his word – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So recently – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Would he endure – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already supportive, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, however, by no means certain to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

Changing Political Culture

The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.

So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his successor would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.

Surveys show the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

In the end, France may not escape its predicament until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Many think that transformation will not be possible under the country’s current constitution. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”